Posts Tagged ‘criminal law’

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Is the Presidential Pardon Headed for Extinction?

July 7, 2010

The Daily Caller has an interesting piece today noting that Obama has not yet pardoned anyone.  This “pardon drought” is apparently one of the longest in U.S. history, trailing just behind Washington, Adams, Clinton, and Bush (W).  (Also, as pardon expert P.S. Ruckman, Jr. observed, Iran has pardoned more people than Obama lately.)  In some ways, Obama’s decision is unsurprising, as the pardon power seems to be a “no-win” situation.  Pardoning a criminal isn’t going to earn celebration from a big chunk of the electorate, while a bad pardon can be disastrous.  Will these considerations drive the presidential pardon into extinction?  And is that a bad thing?

As The Seattle Times explained, ”[t]he concept of clemency dates to Babylonian times, acting as a safety valve for criminal sentences that kings believed were unjust, or a means to show their power to be merciful.  Without clemency, Alexander Hamilton wrote, ‘justice would wear a countenance too sanguinary and cruel.’”  The Framers embraced the right of clemency in Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution, which provides that the president “shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States, except in cases of impeachment.”  Thus, the President may grant clemency in any situation involving a federal crime (which would, interestingly, include any crime here in DC).  The pardon (like other forms of clemency, such as commutation) is meant to address the grey areas of the law while providing a degree of relief to those who have paid their debt and want their rights back.

The president’s clemency power, however, does not give the criminal complete absolution; it carries an imputation of guilt, and the acceptance of a pardon is tantamount to a confession.  See Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 76 (1915).  Moreover, pardons do not often allow convicts to escape from prison time, as they’re only given to those [(update: under the Guidelines, at least)] who have served their prison terms and proven they can live a productive life.  It’s also unlikely to go to anyone who committed a violent crime.  (See, for example, Bush’s pardons.)

To be honest, even though the system is relatively rigid and doesn’t leave murderers wandering the streets or anything, I don’t really see the de facto disappearance of the pardon as a bad thing.  Given their scarcity (even before the recent drought), pardons strike me as an arbitrary act of executive grace that is too de minimis to have any effect on the system as a whole.  It also seems to be an archaic holdover from a time when the king had absolute power — but that absolute power concept is contrary to the American concept of a more limited chief executive.  The pardon abrogates the finding of the jury who convicted the pardoned by stripping the verdict of its punitive weight.  And it appears prone to substantial abuse.

So, here’s hoping the drought continues.

-Michael

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Ride Bike Drunk, Go to Jail (in D.C.)

April 22, 2010

Everton v. District of Columbia, decided today by the D.C. Court of Appeals, confronts “an issue of first impression” in the District, even though the relevant statute “has been in place since the 1920s.”  The issue:  can you get drunk off your ass and then ride around town on your bike?

The answer: nope.  Apparently, a D.C. fellow had a bit too much fun one night, caused a commotion on the street, and then tried to run away from police on his bike.  He succeeded only in almost running over a small child and then falling over.  The court found Mr. Life-of-the-Party could be convicted of a DUI, while engaging in a somewhat disingenuous discussion about the public safety dangers of drunken biking along the way.

The court found that the definition of “vehicle” in the DUI statute should be broadly read, and that a bike is a vehicle because it is an “appliance” mounted on two wheels that can “move over a ‘highway.’”  My big take-away question:  will folks in wheelchairs be able to get their drink on anymore?

-Michael

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Evaluating the Amanda Knox Trial: A Response to Susan

December 7, 2009

Although I find the entire Amanda Knox saga tragic, I have to say that I feel very different about it than Susan apparently does.  True, there is a lot about the Amanda Knox trial that is unsettling: a prosecutor advancing bizarre case theories, a jury apparently driven by nationalist pride, a sensationalist media account that likely tainted the jury pool, etc.  Still, I’m not sure if this case merits State Department involvement, let alone “the big guns.”

As much as we might prefer otherwise, American standards of justice do not apply around the world.  Indeed, it is difficult to establish any principles of due process and justice that apply with equal weight throughout the world.  (Although Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is an attempt to define such rights, even that list is controversial and sometimes ambiguous.)  Thus, Americans cannot expect to enjoy the protections of “American” due process everywhere they go; travel should be accompanied by a recognition that one leaves the protective sphere of America and enters places where the protections might be minimal at best. 

Therefore, the government of the United States should probably only get involved in foreign trials in two instances: (1) where a trial violates well-established principles of international law or (2) where a trial violates the laws of the country where the trial is held.  Even in the second instance, however, involvement should be limited, as a nation should be permitted to interpret its own laws and administer its own system in the manner of its choosing.  Most of the critiques of the Knox trial I have seen don’t implicate either situation, however.  Instead, they are simple attacks on the “weight of the evidence” or the “bias of the prosecutor.”  I don’t think that merits American intervention.

These principles may seem disquieting in a situation like the Amanda Knox trial.  How can we really allow such an “injustice” to proceed?  Nevertheless, as Susan noted, our American system of justice is not that receptive to outside influences.  See, e.g., the Medellin situation involving Texas’ rejection of an ICJ order and international condemnation of our death penalty in general.  If we wish to construct our system of justice in a sphere free from outside influence, we should treat other systems in the same manner.

Lastly, I would question the notion of “American” justice.  It almost goes without saying that American prosecutors are often imperfect instruments of justice, and American juries are often motivated by impure considerations (e.g., racism, a hatred of the poor, etc.)  Outrages upon justice happen over here too, perhaps more often than we care to think about.  I think there’s even some possibility that Amanda Knox would have been found guilty in a stateside trial, given her conflicting accounts and strange behavior following her roommate’s death.  True, the prosecutor’s case theory probably would not have involved any satanic orgies, but in the end that doesn’t matter that much.  And had Amanda been tried in her home state of Washington, she would have been subject to the death penalty (unlike in Italy, where the death penalty is not an option).

As I said, this is not a happy case at all.  But I think it’s important to look past our anger and ask if we actually have a principled leg to stand on before we start taking diplomatic measures against Italy.

-Michael

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Death Row Phenomenon Revisited

December 2, 2009

As I noted a while ago, there seems to be an increasing interest in U.S. jurisprudence in the notion of a “death row phenomenon.”   That interest was reflected yet again in a denial of certiorari in the case of Cecil Johnson, who spent 29 years waiting to die (11 on death row) before being executed early today.  In a statement [PDF] accompanying that denial, Justices Stevens and Breyer both expressed great concern about the length of Johnson’s stay on death row:

[There are] two underlying evils of intolerable delay. First, the delay itself subjects death row inmates to decades of especially severe, dehumanizing conditions of confinement.  Second, “delaying an execution does not further public purposes of retribution and deterrence but only diminishes whatever possible benefit society might receive from petitioner’s death.”  Thus, I find constitutionally significant both the conditions of confinement and the nature of the penalty itself.

[snip]

One does not need to accept the proposition “that the imposition of the death penalty represents ‘the pointless and needless extinction of life with only marginal contributions to any discernible social or public purposes,’” in order to agree that the imposition of the death penalty on these extreme facts is without constitutional justification.

(citations omitted)

Justice Thomas responded with a concurrence in the denial [PDF] that directly rejects any notion of death row phenomenon and mocks the philosophy’s implicit reliance on international law:

It has been 14 years since JUSTICE STEVENS proposed this “novel” Eighth Amendment argument.  I was unaware of any constitutional support for the argument then.  And I am unaware of any support for it now.  There is simply no authority “in the American constitutional tradition or in this Court’s precedent for the proposition that a defendant can avail himself of the panoply of appellate and collateral procedures and then complain when his execution is delayed.”

[snip]

[Justice Stevens's view] deviates from the Constitution and . . . proponents of his view are forced to find their support in precedent from the “European Court of Human Rights, the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe, the Supreme Court of India, or the Privy Council.”

[snip]

At bottom, JUSTICE STEVENS’ arguments boil down to policy disagreements with the Constitution and the Tennessee legislature.  There are, of course, alternatives. As Blackstone observed, the principle that “punishment should follow the crime as early as possible” found expression in a statute decreeing that “in case of murder, the judge shall in his sentence direct execution to be performed on the next day but one after sentence passed.”  I have no doubt that such a system would avoid the diminishing justification problem JUSTICE STEVENS identifies, but I am equally confident that such a system would find little support from this Court.

(citations omitted)

This is a great articulation of both sides of the argument.  Frankly, I don’t know which way to come out on this one, but it should be interesting to see what role international law plays in a debate over the proper interpretation of the Eighth Amendment.

-Michael

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Should Colonel Sanders Be Tried For International Crimes?

December 2, 2009

Everyone loves a good piece of fried chicken, but is it possible that Colonel Sanders (of KFC fame) is an international criminal?  No, I’m not referring to the fact that KFC and its kin have probably caused more deaths than history’s most terrible genocides.  Rather, Colonel Sanders might be guilty of violating international law as a result of some recent shenanigans at the United Nations.

As noted over at Opinio Juris, Colonel Sanders recently breached security at the United Nations and gained access to a number of restricted areas.  Sanders (ok, technically an actor playing Sanders) was even able to pose for a picture with new UN General Assembly president Ali Treki.  There’s no suggestion that the Colonel was engaged in any malicious activity like espionage (although he is very good at keeping secrets).  Even so, one might argue that he violated international law when he started sneaking around the UN complex.

The United Nations complex and the area surrounding it is called the “headquarters district.”  Under Article III, Section 7(a) of the Headquarters Agreement governing the district, that area is “under the control and authority of the United Nations as provided in the agreement.”   Admittedly, the same agreement also provides (in Article III, Section 7(c)):

Except as otherwise provided in this agreement or in the General Convention, the federal, state, and local courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction over acts done and transactions taking place in the headquarters district as provided in applicable federal, state, and local laws.

This provision suggests that Sanders might only have to worry about anything more than a common trespass conviction.  But note that the provision does not vest exclusive jurisdiction in U.S. courts.  Thus, the United Nations may argue that, given the international character of the headquarters district, Colonel Sanders might also be subject to international liability for sneaking into the “inviolable” district.  See Art. III, Sec. 9. 

Still, there are other obstacles that would have to be overcome before we could see the Colonel in the dock at any international court.  First, what international crime did he commit?  Strangely, there would not seem to be any well-established notion of “international trespass” on internationally-held lands.  (I say strangely only because it would seem to be a crime of international concern if other extraterritorial outposts were trespassed upon, like CERN or NATO headquarters.)  It would also be extreme to resort to any prosecution of the basis of international “aggression.”  Lacking a crime, there can be no trial.  Second, where could the Colonel be tried?  The International Criminal Court certainly would not have jurisdiction.  An ad hoc tribunal would be out of the question.  Third, it is unclear whether the United Nations could independently impose any penalty for any violation of “international law” under Section 10 of the Headquarters Agreement:

Persons who violate such regulations [of the United Nations] shall be subject to other penalties or to detention under arrest only in accordance with the provision of such laws or regulations as may be adopted by the appropriate American authorities.

In sum, it looks like the Colonel will escape international prosecution.  Still, I think there’s some chance that KFC’s new “grilled chicken” is an international human rights violation in the making.

-Michael

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Update: Scott Rothstein Arrested

December 1, 2009

In a follow-up to an earlier post, high-flying South Florida lawyer Scott Rothstein was arrested this morning on RICO charges. As the ABA Journal explains:

He is accused of operating a Ponzi scheme involving investments in legal settlements. Investors were asked to make an upfront payment, supposedly to a lawsuit plaintiff expected a series of payments over a period of months or years. Later, the investors were told, they would get back the full settlement amount. “But it was all a scam,” according to the Miami Herald. “Federal prosecutors said there were no plaintiffs, no defendants, no lawsuits.”

To get a sense of what a weirdo this guy is, check out this video tour of his office.

-Michael

P.S. What’s with all the Ponzi schemes lately?

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Tackling A Difficult Issue: United States v. Comstock

November 10, 2009

A recent article (sub. possibly req.) in The Economist comes to the defense of an unlikely group: sex offenders.  The article explains how punishments for sex offenses in the United States have become increasingly draconian in recent years; politicians view newer, tougher laws as an easy way to look “tough on crime,” while no politico in their right mind would vote against such a law.  As one Georgia politician observed:

“Sex offenders are the most reviled people in society. . . . They’re one step above terrorists; there’s no political downside to cracking down on these folks.”

Unfortunately, as the Economist explains, mounting evidence suggests that such laws aren’t even effective

Despite those concerns, Congress stepped up federal sex offender laws in the 2006 Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act.  Among other things, the Act authorizes civil committment of any individual currently incarcerated in the federal system, even after the expiration of their prison term.  The Act only requires that such individuals be found “sexually dangerous” in a commitment hearing, even if the inmate has not previously been convicted of any sex-related crime.  Once it is established by “clear and convincing evidence” that an individual is “sexually dangerous,” they may be confined indefinitely. See 18 U.S.C. 4247.

The Supreme Court is about to consider the constitutionality of these civil committment procedures in United States v. Comstock.  The interesting thing about the case is the way in which it has reframed the debate: the debate over such laws is not “pro-sex-offender” vs. “anti-sex-offender” (a ludicrous debate).  Instead, the libertarians have gotten involved, arguing that the Act overstepped congressional powers [PDF]. 

I note this case principally to observe that it is one of the few situations where I’m happy to see a little judicial activism.  If ever there was a situation where an immensely unpopular minority was suffering from the “violence of the majority,” this is it.  These individuals certainly deserve punishment of the highest degree, but my hope is that the judiciary will approach this problem a bit more objectively than legislators have.

-Michael

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Candy = Crime

October 11, 2009

A new study [abstract] (via Kottke) suggests a link between daily childhood candy eating and crime.  Apparently, 69 percent of people* (in a studied group) who committed crime by age 34 were daily candy eaters. 

What kind of parent gives their kids candy daily?

-Michael

*As Kottke notes, some news agencies are reporting that 69 percent of daily candy eaters became criminals.  That, of course, is an entirely different thing.

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DNA Testing Waivers: Are They Legitimate?

October 11, 2009

A recent article in the Washington Post (via Volokh), discusses a Bush administration policy that requires defendants to waive their rights to post-conviction DNA testing in guilty pleas.  Under the Innocence Protection Act, defendants are permitted, under certain circumstances, to request post-conviction DNA testing of evidence related to their accused crime if they assert they are actually innocent.  In some U.S. Attorney offices, however, defendants who plead guilty are required to waive these rights, ostensibly to keep them from filing frivolous motions to harass prosecutors.  The Obama administration is reviewing this policy and pondering the end of the waiver practice. 

I think that rescinding the policy would be a great idea.  However, in reviewing the actual statute, I’m not so sure that these waivers are permissible as it is.  Under the statute, defendants are permitted to ask for DNA testing so long as they have not “knowingly and voluntarily waive[d] the right to request DNA testing of that evidence in a court proceeding.”  I’m not sure waivers are “voluntary” if they are required in order to receive the benefits of a guilty plea.  Black’s Law Dictionary defines “voluntary” as “unconstrained by interference; not impelled by outside influence; without valuable consideration; gratuitous.”  It seems to me that in this situation a defendant’s waiver is certainly not without outside influence–he waives only because of the threat of trial.  Admittedly, some might argue that no defendant is required to plead guilty.  But a defendant who admits his guilt with regard to a particular crime should not be forced to enter the crapshoot that is the jury trial. 

Putting aside the wording of the statute, we need to recognize the fallibility of the guilty plea.  People (obviously) make these pleas for a number of strategic reasons unrelated to their guilt or innocence.  Discouraging post-conviction DNA testing after guilty pleas essentially concedes that (1) we have innocent people in jail; (2) we have proof that could get them out; and (3) we don’t care.  The Washington Post article quotes the acting U.S. Attorney back in my old hometown of Macon, who justifies the policy by observing that “[i]t saves [the government] a lot of spurious litigation down the pike.”  Eliminating post-conviction relief via habeas corpus would also save a lot of spurious litigation, but we recognize the important purpose it serves: every once in a while someone should legitimately be released.  Why should IPA testing be any different?

 -Michael

Update: Susan asks: “I do remember from bar study that case about the defendant claiming it was coercion when the prosecutor offered him a choice of “take this plea, or I’ll jury trial your ass for a much much worse offense.”  What’s the difference here?”

My response I would say that with your example, you’re trading your right to contest the charges in a judicial proceeding for the lower sentence. In the IPA context, you’re trading your right to actually prove your actual innocence via scientific evidence for the guilty plea to which you would otherwise have been “entitled” to.

Of course, Susan makes another good point that one “could always plead guilty anyway, you [would just] have no control over the [sentence] you get.”

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The infallible dog is a creature of legal fiction.

October 5, 2009

This article today at CNN reminded me of something I’ve been interested in for a while now — the reliability of sniffer dog use in criminal investigations and law enforcement.

There are two major uses of dogs in this context that are highly problematic: use of dogs for “scent lineups” to identify criminal suspects and use of narcotics detecting dogs. (In most other contexts, I’m a-okay pretty much across the board with dog tracking– I don’t have any problems with using dogs for detecting explosives or for border searches.) While drug scenting dogs are a much more complicated legal problem, relating to the constitutional requirement of probable cause for Fourth Amendment purposes, the use of dogs for scent lineups has a much greater empirical problem, and their use in the courtroom has not been methodologically sound [PDF].

The requirements for a sniffer dog to be certified are not particularly rigorous, and in Texas and Florida especially, it looks as if a lot of innocent people have been put behind bars as a result of unscrupulous practices by dog trainers. A major problem in the use of scent lineups is that, while dogs actually are pretty good at picking out the “correct” scent from a list of possibilities put before them, when provided with a scent line up with no correct matches, the dogs will all too often default to a “closest match” and produce a false positive.

For the use of narcotics dogs, the science isn’t much more comforting. Although you generally won’t get a false conviction because of the use of a drug sniffer dog (either the police find the drugs on you or they don’t), their use amounts to a real infringement on Fourth Amendment protections. Under United States v. Place, brief detention by law enforcement in a public area for the purpose of carrying out a “dog sniff” is not a search for Fourth Amendment purposes. In Illinois v. Caballes, Justice Souter dissented (from which the title of this post is also taken), noting that:

At the heart of both Place and the Court’s opinion today is the proposition that sniffs by a trained dog are sui generis because a reaction by the dog in going alert is a response to nothing but the presence of contraband. . . . Hence, the argument goes, because the sniff can only reveal the presence of items devoid of any legal use, the “sniff does not implicate legitimate privacy interests” and is not to be treated as a search. . . .

Pretty much every circuit — except possibly my home circuit, the 11th, which has not “squarely addressed” the question — treats it as probable cause to undergo a search when a sniffer dog gives a positive hit. The only evidentiary standards are that the handler must testify to the dog being “trained” and “reliable”. (The only exception to this rule that a not-particularly-thorough search turned up: United States v. Trayer, 898 F.2d 805, 808 (D.C. Cir. 1990)(dog giving positive hit alert at sleeper car on train is not in itself probable cause)).

And most worryingly, some circuits only look at the training of the dog, not the handler. This is pretty faulty reasoning, as the trainer is half the equation — they’re the ones who have to interpret what the dog is indicating. See United States v. Outlaw, 134 F.Supp.2d 701, 813 (5th Cir. 2003) (“an alert is simply an interpretation of a change in the dog’s behavior by a human handler”). In addition to bad trainers who aren’t used to the dogs and don’t know when they’re giving an alert, there’s also the possibility of very closely trained dog/handler combos being susceptible to the Clever Hans effect.

Dogs just aren’t perfect. For example, tired dogs do significantly worse than rested dogs — dogs can’t sweat so they have to pant to dissipate heat, and unfortunately you can’t exactly pant and sniff at the same time — so an overworked and overheated dog is going to produce less reliable results. However, even assuming all dogs are as infallible as Rin Tin Tin, a positive alert from a narcotics dog just doesn’t seem to meet the threshold for probable cause.

Using Bayes’ theorem, and granting dubiously high estimates of dog accuracy (98%) at detecting when drugs are present, and assuming .5% of the population possesses drugs on them at any given time, then then the odds of a dog alert correctly indicating the presence of drugs is only 1 in 5.

“If the dog sniffs 10,000 people, 50 (10,000 x .005) will possess drugs. Out of these, the dog will correctly alert to 49 (50 x .98). Of the remaining 9950 people that do not possess drugs, the dog will falsely alert to 2% of this group, resulting in 199 (9950 x .02) false detections.

Out of this population of 10,000, the dog has positively alerted to 248 people, 49 of which are correct detections and 199 are false alerts. Thus, the probability that an individual actually possesses cocaine based on this dog is 49 out of 248, a detection rate of less than 20%.” Robert Bird, An Examination of the Training and Reliability of the Narcotics Detection Dog, 85 Ky. L.J. 405 (1996).

That doesn’t sound like probable cause to me.

-Susan