Posts Tagged ‘constitutional law’

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Federal Judge Declares DOMA “Gay-Marriage” Provision Unconstitutional

July 8, 2010

Federal District Court Judge Joseph Tauro (D. Mass) issued a significant decision [PDF] today, ruling that Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act is unconstitutional.  Judge Tauro concluded that the section, defining marriage as exclusively between a man and a woman, violates the Equal Protection Clause.  Interestingly, the Court concluded that the statute “fails to pass constitutional muster even under the highly deferential rational basis test.”

The Court explained:

This court simply “cannot say that [DOMA] is directed to any identifiable legitimate purpose or discrete objective. It is a status-based enactment divorced from any factual context from which [this court] could discern a relationship to legitimate [government] interests. Indeed, Congress undertook this classification for the one purpose that lies entirely outside of legislative bounds, to disadvantage a group of which it disapproves. And such a classification, the Constitution clearly will not permit.  In the wake of DOMA, it is only sexual orientation that differentiates a married couple entitled to federal marriage-based benefits from one not so entitled. And this court can conceive of no way in which such a difference might be relevant to the provision of the benefits at issue.  By premising eligibility for these benefits on marital status in the first instance, the federal government signals to this court that the relevant distinction to be drawn is between married individuals and unmarried individuals. To further divide the class of married individuals into those with spouses of the same sex and those with spouses of the opposite sex is to create a distinction without meaning. And where, as here, “there is no reason to believe that the disadvantaged class is different, in relevant respects” from a similarly situated class, this court may conclude that it is only irrational prejudice that motivates the challenged classification.  As irrational prejudice plainly never constitutes a legitimate government interest, this court must hold that Section 3 of DOMA as applied to Plaintiffs violates the equal protection principles embodied in the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

The Court relies substantially on Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), which struck down a Colorado law preventing homosexuals from ever being classified as a protected class.

The decision, standing alone, will have only a limited impact on DOMA going forward.  But it will be interesting to see if the Obama administration appeals, as a decision from the First Circuit on this issue could have real impact.  (Although the opinion of one Circuit court judge is already out there.)  A big decision against DOMA might also signal to the judge deciding the Boies-Olson Prop. 8 trial in California that other jurists find anti-gay-marriage provisions troubling.

-Michael

Update: The New York Times has a good discussion, including some quotes from experts on what the prospects for appeal look like.

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Gay Rights Are Human Rights

April 17, 2010

Earlier this week, President Obama issued a memorandum on “Respecting the Rights of Hospital Patients to Receive Visitors and to Designate Surrogate Decision Makers for Medical Emergencies.” The memo requires all hospitals that participate in Medicaid and Medicare to (1) Allow patients to designate who is able to visit them, and (2) Follow the advance medical directives of their patients, such as durable powers of attorney and health care proxies.

Yesterday, a Circuit Court Judge in Arkansas issued an order striking down an Arkansas law that prohibits any unmarried person who has a non-platonic relationship with someone they live with from either adopting or fostering a child.

These two decisions are being trumpeted as victories for gay rights, as they should be. But the gay rights promoted by these decisions are only a component of the much broader category of human rights that are being recognized here — the associational rights of all persons. In other words, the decisions recognize peoples’ right to establish interpersonal relationships in the manner that best serves their individual needs, and not in the manner dictated by social tradition. In a free society, we should be free to choose which relationships we want to have with which people, and the degree of importance to be attributed to each of those relationships. The government has no business in deciding on everyone’s behalf which sorts of relationships “count” — i.e., only those between kin and those between opposite sex spouses.

The Executive Memorandum issued by Obama was a no-brainer that should have been done decades ago. Hospitals do not operate on the free market — people just don’t get to pick and choose hospitals based upon the associational rights they recognize. In the case of sudden injury, people can be transported to a hospital not of their choice. Or, in the case of rare conditions that require a specialist facility only found in a handful of hospitals across the country, a patient will have no effective ability to choose a hospital based on whether or not they will allow a partner to visit.

In a case like that, I have no problem with the government ordering hospitals to respect patient’s wishes. Hospitals that mandate only kin are allowed to visit are substituting a patient’s actual preferences (or even contractual specifications!) with an idealized, moralistic vision of who a patient should prefer to visit them.

The issues raised by the Arkansas Act — which is “An Act Providing That An Individual Who is Cohabitating Outside of a Valid Marriage May Not Adopt or Be a Foster Parent of a Child Less than Eighteen Years Old” — are not quite so cut and dry. Although the state has no legitimate interest in dictating people’s personal relationships, the state very much does have a legitimate interest in protecting the best interests of the children placed in its care. The trick, then, is to prevent the government from using its interest in children’s welfare as a means of infringing upon rights they have no business messing with.

In Cole v. Department of Human Services, the judge decided that the U.S. Constitution was not implicated, but that the statute violated the Arkansas state constitution’s protection of privacy rights.

Under the U.S. Constitution, the right to adopt or foster a child is not fundamental, and that cohabitating people are not a not a suspect class. Therefore, rational basis review was to be applied. Therefore, the Arkansas Act could only be examined under rational basis review, which means the ban on adoption by a cohabitating person is constitutional so long as it is ‘rationally related to a legitimate government purpose.’ This is a very easy test to pass — under rational basis review, even if it’s very obvious that the legislature was talking out of it’s ass when it made up a piece of legislation, so long as a judge can squint at it and conceive of some sort of logical purpose that the legislature could have had, the statute will be allowed.

The state’s theory was that “cohabitating environments, on average, facilitate poorer child performance outcomes and expose children to higher risks of abuse.” Although this is an overbroad and less than scientific assumption, under a rational basis review, it’s sufficient. I’m a little skeptical, however, of the judge’s blithe assumption that rational basis review applies here.

First, the idea that no “fundamental right” is at stake doesn’t square with the judge’s analysis under the Arkansas constitution. The Arkansas Adoption Act was invalidated for violating the “fundamental privacy right to private, consensual, non-commercial sexual activity” under Arkansas’ constitution. This sounds awfully similar to the same fundamental privacy right protected by the Federal Constitution that the Supreme Court has recognized in sodomy and contraception cases.

Second, I’m not completely buying the idea that “cohabitating couples” are not a suspect class. Under the Equal Protection clause, federal laws addressing “illegitimates” are reviewed under an intermediate level of scrutiny. I wonder if perhaps this precedent could be turned around and used to advance the argument that the parents of out of wedlock kids are themselves semi-suspect class. After all, at its heart, the court’s illegitimacy jurisprudence truly is truly one about associational rights — i.e., whether or not the government can decide, ex ante, for all people, that relationships with out of wedlock children are not as significant as relationships with children from wedlock.

So given all that, I’m not really convinced that the judge had to decide this case based upon the Arkansas Constitution and not the U.S. Constitution. Then again, this would be a pretty effective way of possibly insulating the case from review by SCOTUS…

Constitutional law aside, the Judge’s invalidation of the Arkansas Adoption Act was not specifically about gay rights, but about the private association rights of all persons. For instance, in the following scenario, a straight person is just as adversely effected by the law: Say that both of a child’s parents die. The child’s aunt then wants to adopt her niece or nephew, but she is living with her long term boyfriend, whom she has been a stable relationship with for ten years. Under the Arkansas Adoption Act, she is prohibited from doing so.

It is not the state’s place to mandate the interpersonal relationships people must have in order to enjoy equal protection under the law. Gay or straight, the government has no legitimate interest in who we decide to invite to our holiday dinners or who we choose to make a home with. Although I’m happy to see ever greater protections afforded to gay Americans, that is only the beginning, not the end, of the fight against governmental coercion in peoples’ personal relationships.

-Susan

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The Constitutionality of Christmas

December 23, 2009

Yay, it’s almost Jesus’ b-day! But, in light of the Establishment Clause, how does our government get to take the day off, too?   Under 5 U.S.C. § 6103, government employees are officially entitled to stay home on December 25th and celebrate the birth of Christ by eating too much, exchanging the finest goods that Wal-Mart has to offer, and drinking enough eggnog to make the room spin.  But surely the people of the Bible Belt wouldn’t be as happy to see a similar government-sanctioned celebration of the birthday of Zarathustra.  So how do the Christians get away with it?

It turns how that courts have officially recognized the secularization of Christmas.  For a long while now, courts across the land have recognized that “the Christmas holiday in our national culture contains both secular and sectarian elements.”  Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 709 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).  As the Seventh Circuit explained a while ago:

Some holidays that are religious, even sectarian, in origin, such as Christmas and Thanksgiving, have so far lost their religious connotation in the eyes of the general public … [that they] have only a trivial effect in promoting religion.

Metzl v. Leininger, 57 F.3d 618, 620 (7th Cir.1995); see also American Civil Liberties Union v. City of St. Charles, (“There is nothing distinctively Christian about reindeer, Santa Claus, gift-giving, eggnog, tinsel, toys, retail sales, roast goose, or the music (as distinct from the words) of Christmas carols.”).

So, for all those out there of a non-Christian bent, drink down the eggnog with the understanding that even your government thinks Christmas doesn’t have anything to do with Christ anymore. 

-Michael

Update: I forgot to include a poem from one of the judges who addressed the “constitutional Christmas” question.  It’s further evidence that judges are not the poets they sometimes fancy themselves, but it’s also pretty funny.  From Ganulin v. United States, 71 F. Supp. 2d 824 (S.D. Ohio 1999):

The Court will address Plaintiff’s confusion,
Erroneously believing Christmas is a merely a religious intrusion.
Whatever the reason, constitutional or other,
Christmas is not an act of Big Brother!
Christmas is about joy and giving and sharing,
It is about the child within us and mostly about caring!
One is never jailed for not having a tree,
For not going to church, for not spreading glee!
The Court will uphold seemingly contradictory causes,
Decreeing the “Establishment” and “Santa” both worthwhile “Clauses!”
We are all better for Santa, the Easter Bunny, too,
And maybe the Great Pumpkin to name just a few!
An extra day off is hardly high treason,
It may be spent as you wish regardless of reason!
The court having read the lessons of Lynch,
Refuses to play the role of the Grinch!
There is room in this country, and in all our hearts, too,
For different convictions and a day off, too!

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Confederate NAACP President Threatens to Sue Atheist Councilmember

December 14, 2009

In North Carolina, a recently elected non-theist councilman’s ability to hold office is being questioned due to his lack of religious belief. Cecil Bothwell, who describes himself as “post-theist,” (although as one intrepid journalist uncovered, he is listed as atheist on his MySpace page. God, I love modern reporting), already had his atheism challenged during the election campaign, by mailers referencing his lack of religious belief. He won anyway, so now a suit is being threatened:

That has riled conservative activists, who cite a little-noticed quirk in North Carolina’s Constitution that disqualifies officeholders “who shall deny the being of Almighty God.” The provision was included when the document was drafted in 1868 and wasn’t revised when North Carolina amended its constitution in 1971. One foe, H.K. Edgerton, is threatening to file a lawsuit in state court against the city to challenge Bothwell’s appointment.

[Update: H.K. Edgerton, it turns out, is a few fries short of a happy meal. See below for more information on the Confederate NAACP president.]

Article 6, section 8 of the North Carolina Constitution prohibits from office “First, any person who shall deny the being of Almighty God.” Legally, though, Edgerton’s claims against Bothwell don’t have a leg to stand on.

Article VI, section 3 of the U.S. federal constitution provides that “no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.” Torcaso v. Watkins held that under the First Amendment (and incorporated by the Fourteenth), states could not use religious tests — whether or not Article 6 is applicable to the states or only the federal government is technically an open issue, but also rather moot. (Actually, this brings up a question I am sure has been brought up before but do not have time to research now… If the First Amendment was, originally, intended to be as broad as it is in today’s constitutional jurisprudence, why would the Founders have found it necessary to include the religious test clause to boot?). But Torcaso found that Maryland could not actually enforce a clause from its constitution that stated, “nor shall any person, otherwise competent, be deemed incompetent as a witness, or juror, on account of his religious belief; provided, he believes in the existence of God, and that under His dispensation such person will be held morally accountable for his acts, and be rewarded or punished therefor either in this world or in the world to come.”

From the language, the Maryland constitution, unlike the North Carolina one, seems to reflect more of a concern with assuring the veracity of witnesses or jurors rather than any direct concern for religion. Because if someone does not believe they will be held morally accountable in the next world, how could they possibly be concerned with being morally accountable in this world?

Anyway, North Carolina is not alone in having unenforceable religious requirements. The state constitutions of Maryland, Massachusetts, South Carolina, Tenessee and Texas also have language in their constitutions prohibiting non-religious (or possibly non-monotheistically religious) persons from carrying out certain state functions. Texas, for instances, places a requirement on officeholders being people that “acknowledge the existence of a Supreme Being.”

But why are these obviously unenforceable provisions still hanging around in the Constitution?

Provisions like North Carolina’s tend to stay on the books because lawmakers would rather not spend time weeding out outdated laws, said Duke University Law School Professor Joseph Blocher.

“I mean there are state laws against spitting in the street,” he said. “Why spend the time?”

I find this explanation rather unpersuasive. Sodomy laws, religious test clauses, and other unenforceable statutes or constitutional clauses remain on the books in state courts because legislators don’t wish to risk publicly coming out in favor of “allowing sodomy” or “letting atheists take office.” So they let the laws molder there, pretending they don’t exist, until someone or another goes on a moral crusade and tries, once again, to breathe life back into them.

Anyone who campaigned on a platform that included removing all of the vestigial and antiquated cultural baggage from our laws would have my vote. Even if they are not enforced, leaving them on the books can and sometimes does cause an unwarranted burden on citizens who, in a bygone era, would have faced heavier discrimination. Not to mention, it’s also pretty embarrassing for the state involved.

-Susan

ETA: Wait, hold the horses. Two quotes, from different articles about the guy threatening the lawsuit, caught my eye:

“If they go ahead, then the city of Asheville and the board of elections could be liable for a lawsuit,” said Edgerton, who is known for promoting ‘Southern heritage’ by standing on streets decked out in a Confederate soldier’s uniform and holding a Confederate flag.

“My father was a Baptist minister. I’m a Christian man. I have problems with people who don’t believe in God,” said Edgerton, a former local NAACP president and founder of Southern Heritage 411, an organization that promotes the interests of black southerners.

NCAAP president in cosplaying as a Confederate soldier? That’s a new one for me. Looking now, according to Wikipedia, Southern Heritage 411 “provides Southern viewpoints such as that there was great love between the African who was here in the Southland and his master and research on Black Confederate participation in the American Civil War.”

This is not the first time H.K. Edgerton has been in the news. I think this quote on Edgerton summarizes it best:

“His elevator doesn’t go all the way to the top,” Rev. Skip Alston, executive director of the North Carolina NAACP, told a reporter recently. “It doesn’t even reach the second floor. We don’t recognize anything that he’s doing.”

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A Response To Scalia’s Blathering

October 5, 2009

Although Susan has already covered Scalia’s recent ramblings, I was planning to do as well, so I’ll throw a few more thoughts in.  Much of what Susan said addresses how law rightfully attracts intelligent individuals.  She also takes a law and economics approach to explaining the social value that lawyering actually generates.  Although law and economics is nothing new on this blog, I think it’s also useful to return to first principles for a moment.  When returning to those principles, these types of comments from Scalia–a strong defender of personal freedom and respect for history–are even more incomprehensible.

When our nation was first created, we chose three essential principles to hold most dear: “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”  Our forefathers created this nation because we felt that the bonds of an oppressive government stood in opposition to the achievement of those fundamental goals.  Even though we may be free from the chains of the British crown, government and law are still potential tools of oppression.  Therefore, it becomes the duty of those involved in our legal system to ensure that those values are preserved.

“The public defender from Podunk” is one example of one of the last lines of defense against the destruction of liberty.  If that young woman “wasn’t really brilliant,” perhaps innocent men would be tried, jailed, and stamped with the badge of dishonor that a felony conviction is often taken to be.  That young woman might go out and “invent the automobile,” but our country may face a horrible tradeoff for those four wheels: we may have more of our citizens unjustly stripped of their three most important possessions: life, liberty, and happiness.  The criminal lawyer, therefore, is the protector of these personal rights from societal oppression.

I understand these arguments might seem most relevant in the criminal context, but I think civil lawyers do something terribly important as well.  If we go back even further to the First Continental Congress’ Declaration of Colonial Rights, we find a different description of our most cherished national belongings: “life, liberty, and property.”  The civil lawyer, therefore, guards against the unjust deprivation of the property that is rightfully his.  The civil lawyer, therefore, is the protector of these property rights from societal oppression.

For any devoted constitutionalist to disavow these cardinal values is deplorable.  For Scalia to use his position of power to espouse these views is just plain stupid.

-Michael

Update:  Now folks over at Volokh are talking about this, too.

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Attorney-Client Privilege [Apparently] Extends To Your Sketchy Roommate’s Bedroom

September 24, 2009

One of my favorite places to find a good laugh is a website called Passive Aggressive Notes.  The site is exactly what you’d expect: a repository for insanely funny passive-aggressive notes.  Normally, that kind of thing doesn’t have anything to do with law, but I couldn’t help but post this gem

Apparently, one roommate planned to throw a party.  The other roommate planned to be out of town and was concerned someone would use his bed.  So, logically, the roommate posted a notice invoking attorney-client privilege, the Iowa constitution, Iowa statute, federal statute, and the U.S. Constitution.  Some highlights (and I’m not even going to try to insert [sic]s):

This room is protected as later defined from trespassing.  There is privileged information contained within. . . . If you feel the need to disrespect me, State Gov’t, and Federal Gov’t, as well as those person found on the classified documents, then you will be prosecuted.

. . .

I will not jeopardize my future law career and will therefore not be afraid to press charges for violations found herein.

-Michael

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“Today’s Constitutional Law”

September 19, 2009

Over at the Volokh Conspiracy, Prof. Randy Barnett offers a pretty sad assessment of “today’s constitutional law”:

[I]f the Supreme Court adopts a “presumption of constitutionality” by which it defers to the Congress’s judgment of the constitutionality of its actions–as it has and as “judicial conservatives” urge–and the Congress adopts [the] view that “unconstitutionality” means whatever the Supreme Court says, then NO ONE EVER evaluates whether a[n] act of Congress is or is not authorized by the Constitution. A pretty neat trick–and a pretty accurate description of today’s constitutional law.

With all due respect to Professor Barnett, I think this is not the state of today’s constitutional law.  First, I think Congress does more than assuming a deferential Supreme Court will rubber stamp all of its legislation.  Even if the Commerce Clause doesn’t give many legislators reason for pause, there are still other constitutional provisions that Congress worries about.  (Witness, for example, the constitutional hubub over the attempt to give D.C. a vote in the House.)

Second, even though Prof. Barnett may be frustrated that the Commerce Clause isn’t invoked by the Supreme Court more often, a presumption of constitutionality is not absolute.  The Supreme Court obviously does strike down certain congressional legislation on constitutional grounds.  Indeed, important pieces of legislation (like the Patriot Act and the Defense of Marriage Act) have come under constitutional fire, and cases like Morrison and Lopez suggest that the Court will step in when Congress goes too far.  Prof. Barnett shouldn’t lose sight of that.  (Frankly, I’m hoping his views aren’t simply skewed by being on the losing end of Gonzales v. Raich, which he argued before the Court.)

-Michael

Update: Prof. Barnett has reaffirmed this understanding of constitutional law, this time with even more ALL CAPS and bold text!

This point is so important that I should repeat it. [W]hen it comes to the enumerated powers of Congress, the Supreme Court should defer to Congress’s assessment of constitutionality (because of judicial restraint); and Congress should defer to the Supreme Court’s assessment of constitutionality (because “the Supreme Court is the ultimate authority on the Constitution”). So NO ONE SHOULD ACTUALLY INTERPRET THE CONSTITUTION! This is current American constitutional “law” in nutshell.