Author Archive

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Introducing the Virginia Business Law Blog

March 5, 2010

As Michael put it to me earlier this week, I have turned into a blogger of limited fidelity. (Well, that’s not quite how he put it, but I am sure you get the general idea.)

Sadly, it is true. I am now posting on my firm’s blog, Virginia Business Law Blog, and I feel obligated to direct a good chunk of my blogging energy there. So expect the View from LL2 to become a little less regular in its updates.

LL2 shouldn’t fear, however — I may be posting a bit less, but this place will still be getting my attention. I am fairly certain that the firm has absolutely zero interest in providing a forum for my ramblings on international law, science fiction, and video games, so at least I will have no choice but to post my thoughts on those topics up here. (Then again… Mythic Entertainment is based out of Fairfax. And Bethesda Softworks is only just across the border in Maryland. So I suppose there’s always an off-chance I could get lucky and that could become relevant…)

Anyway, although cross-posting is lame (and, well, technically, I suppose I don’t even have copyright to the posts I write there), I am not above attempting to direct traffic to my work over there. So if you have any interest in, well, Virginia business law (or at least my somewhat uneducated attempts to write about it), you can read my posts over there:

  1. Virginia’s “Amazon Tax” Fails to Survive the House
  2. It Is Not Contributory Negligence As A Matter Of Law To Merely Bite Into Food Served Hot By A Restaurant
  3. The Difference Between .Org and .Com
  4. When It Comes to Million Dollar Verdicts and Settlements In Virginia, Bodily Injury Is King

-Susan

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“Untreated Chronic Pain Violates International Law”

March 5, 2010

When I saw the above headline, it struck me immediately as a possible contender for the Most Absurd Claim To A Customary Norm of International Law Yet. (Even one of my long time favorites, the ATS case involving the use of under-aged camel jockeys, had a better basis.) Although there is a very good case to be made that, under international law, states have a duty to avoid causing chronic pain in their citizens, there is hardly one white of support for the idea that they are obliged to treat it.

It turns out the story is based upon a Human Rights Watch Report [PDF] that presents access to narcotics and relief from chronic pain as a human right enshrined under international law. Somewhat to my surprise, HRW starts not with a CIL argument, but claims that that the right to treatment of chronic pain is a treaty based obligation. For this they cite a single paragraph of the preamble of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961, which provides that the signatory states are

Concerned with the health and welfare of mankind, [and]

Recogniz[e] that the medical use of narcotic drugs continues to be indispensable for the relief of pain and suffering and that adequate provision must be made to ensure the availability of narcotic drugs for such purposes…

Unfortunately for the HRW report, however, the Convention was clearly not intended to address the availability of pain medication, but rather was entered into by states in an effort to curb cross-border drug trafficking. “Pain” or “suffering” is not mentioned again in the treaty’s text. Even giving it the most generous interpretation, all this language signifies is that the object and purpose of the treaty is to reduce world drug trafficking while not also prohibiting the legitimate medical use of narcotics.

The HRW report also undermines any claims that the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 is the basis of a customary norm that has developed since the treaty entered into force. According to the HRW report, “approximately 80 percent of the world population has either no or insufficient access to treatment for moderate to severe pain.” Given the total absence of any opinio juris on the subject, a mere 20% compliance rate does not a norm make.

I will not even address the report’s batpoop crazy claim that the well established and more-or-less globally accepted norm against cruel, inhumane, and degrading treatment applies to chronic pain, because “[a]s part of this positive obligation [against CITD], states have to take steps to protect people from unnecessary pain related to a health condition.” Seriously, HRW?

I suppose I could accept that the right to treatment of chronic pain qualifies as an aspirational norm, albeit a pretty weak one. The World Health Organization does list codeine and morphine on its Model List of Essential Medicines, a list signifying those drugs which states should endeavor to make available to all of their citizens that need them. But that’s about the most I can say for the study’s claims.

Of course, all of this is definitely not to suggest that the report does not in fact identify a genuine problem. As HRW notes, “Burkina Faso estimates that 8 people need morphine per year. Gabon estimates 14. The Gambia, 31.” Hard to argue with a need for education and reform there. But by cloaking every worthy policy suggestion in a nonsensical guise of “international law,” HRW is actually undermining the rule of international law on the global plane.

-Susan

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Samantar v. Yousuf…

March 3, 2010

… was anticlimactic. Although we succeeded in running into quite a few GW Law people, we did not succeed in getting seated. (I may have succeeded in getting frostbite, however.)

Poor Michael was #52 in line, and they only let a grand total of 50 in. So he has the distinction of being the second loser. Although the first loser had it worst — it was the second time in which he had been the first person to not get seated at a hearing. I will accept some responsibility for us missing the hearing, as I had the bright idea of changing our meet up time from 6am to 7am. Poor form, I know.

The guards stationed in front of the steps informed us that it had been less crowded for friggin’ McDonald than it was for Samantar, which is ridiculous, because it was rainy and cold and Samantar does not involve guns.

Also I still maintain that Michael lost his spot to Harold Koh, who came waltzing across the plaza with his entourage about five minutes before the oral argument started. Excuse me, sir, I do not believe that the U.S. is a party to this case, so you can just go wait in line with the rest of us, thank you very much.

Anyway, as a very poor consolation prize, we were at least in the first group for the silly 3-5 minute viewing exercise they have for tourists. Didn’t really see or hear much, though. The transcripts are up for the case now, but I think at this point I will have to put off reading it until tomorrow. Will probably have more thoughts then.

But I swear, if I ever find out that that class of 8-10 year olds that was let in got seated and we didn’t, I will lose all faith in American democracy.

-Susan

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Samantar v. Yousuf, Last Minute Thoughts

March 2, 2010

There are two questions in Samantar v. Yousuf that I suspect almost certainly will not get addressed in the morning, at least not in any substantive way, but I’ll post them here now in the hope that I am wrong and I’ll be able to talk about them in greater length tomorrow. These would be:

(1) The statehood of Somalia v. Somaliland, and the ability of the former to adopt the acts of officials that took place in a territory it no longer has any control over, outside of legal fiction. Obviously even if they do bother with the question, the Court will end up punting it to the political branches and making their recognition the be-all end-all, but I would still love to see statehood get addressed in one of the Justice’s opinions. Even better would be for the Court to address the factual issues regarding Somalia or Somaliland’s existence or non-existence, but I won’t hold out hope for that.

(2) The Constitutional question of FSIA’s purported grant of personal jurisdiction over state officials via service of process. If petitioner succeeds on his arguments, there could be a problem with FSIA’s provision for service of process over foreign states — namely, service of process (done anywhere, not just tag-service) is considered sufficient for obtaining personal jurisdiction over a state. But if officials = state for purposes of the FSIA, allowing mere service to create personal jurisdiction for foreign official defendants would create a Constitutional due process issue.

I mostly want #2 to be addressed because I would love to see the Supreme Court finally address the giant gaping inconsistency in U.S. law that is our personal jurisdiction jurisprudence. Since personal jurisdiction is a question of Fifth (or Fourteenth) Amendment due process, if petitioner prevails, we could, at least theoretically, wind up with some interesting issues of the “Constitutional rights” of foreign states that have never had contact with the U.S.

At any rate, I’m sure there will be some amusement to be had tomorrow, out of the slight irony in the case that the side most heavily relying on the support of international law and argues that the court should find it has expansive powers to decide the questions involved is the side hoping that the Court does not find jurisdiction to hear an ATS/TVPA claim, while the side that is calling for a strict adherence to the separation of powers and arguing that any judicial interference would result in Dire Consequences is the side hoping that the court does hear the underlying claim. Strange bedfellows, and all that.

For what it’s worth, I’m rooting for the respondent. Jurisdiction should be found here — to do otherwise would lead to absurd results. That a given defendant claims to have been some sort of official office holder for some sort of government that may have once existed is not sufficient to give him a blanket claim to immunity in U.S. courts. Rather than making this a jurisdictional matter, this case should be heard on a substantive level, with the act of state doctrine helping to provide the proper rules of decision.

Plus, finally, the fact Samantar cherry picks between the multitude of “Somali” governments to find a couple that support his claim is hilarious. If you’re trying to claim sovereign immunity, referring to “the transitional governments,” plural, of your supposed State does not much help your case. If any warlord in Somalia with enough followers can claim to be the sovereign, why on earth should the FSIA or international law believe that Samantar managed to siphon off some immunity for himself?

-Susan

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And the Winner For Best Advertisement For Legal Services Goes To…

February 28, 2010

Cooney & Conway, for a spot advertising their mesothelioma claims practice. It features an older woman, who speaks into the camera with a tone of utmost sincerity, her eyes practically welling up with heartfelt gratitude, as she describes the attorneys that helped get her a settlement:

“They were more than lawyers… They were human beings.”

-Susan

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Man as the Default, Woman as the Other: Fox News’ Ridiculously Pointless Sexism

February 25, 2010

Although I would be curious to see the results of an empirical look at the question, my own experience has been that Fox News is the most horrible of all major media organizations when it comes to a very old, very tired and insidious version of sexism: the concept of male as the default, and female as the “other.”

Whenever I watch Fox, I am constantly cringing at their coverage of every day news events. “In Texas, a woman motorist was involved in a collision…” “At the CDC, a female research scientist working on contagious diseases reports that…” “A conviction for embezzlement was handed down today for a female trust fund manager…”

Sometimes — sometimes — these characterizations are not all that offensive or nerve-grating, particularly where the gender ratio of the descriptive noun being used is very large. For instance, describing someone as a “female suicide bomber” might be appropriate where, in the context of the news blurb, the gender is unusual and there is no other way to convey that information in a brief sentence. And, of course, where the person’s gender is actually relevant to the story, providing that information is acceptable and expected, even when done in the clumsy “female [noun]” structure.

But, generally, Fox News simply attaches “woman” or “female” in every instance that a noun happens to refer to someone with an XX chromosome. Because male is the default; male is the normal, the average, the expected. In Fox News’ world, people are male until indicated otherwise.

In think in particular it is Fox’s constant use of “woman motorist” that drives me the most batty. By definition, easily half of motorists are women, and, equally by definition, “motorist” is completely gender neutral. Just in terms of writing style, it is offensively clumsy and jarring to the ear — why on earth use that descriptor when in the next sentence you’re going to clarify any confusion anyway by referring to her with a pronoun anyway?

Today, while on Fox News’ page to skim another article, I noticed a link to the day’s most popular stories, and it included the following headline:

Report: Female Trainer Killed at SeaWorld’s Shamu Stadium.

The inclusion of “female” in the headline is, on the scale of things, a relatively minor offense. But it is only because habitual gender essentialism and female othering is so pervasive in the media that such a headline can exist. Augh, why? Why is it necessary to ensure that her classification as “female” is specified there? The poor woman’s gender is quickly revealed in the story — so how could it possibly be worth wasting valuable headline real estate on declaring it? And why is “orca whale trainer,” of all things, considered to be a default masculine term? Is there really some sort of cultural precept that considers whale trainers to be a predominantly male category?

I don’t mean to claim that any intentional sexism or even deliberate thought went into crafting that headline; in fact, what I am pointing out is directly the opposite. It is a reflexive and natural-seeming act for the authors to use such phrasings, even if the result is an awkward and wasteful sentence. But it is still sexism, of a kind, and the only way to combat the sort of sexism that is the force of ingrained thinking and not of the slightest malicious will is to acknowledge and call out its existence. Fox News ought to fix its style book; the “woman motorist” and “female trainer” bits do nothing for the quality of its reporting.

-Susan

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Bald Eagles on the George Washington Memorial Parkway

February 24, 2010

I was driving up the GW Parkway this morning, and as I was going around one of the bends near the scenic overlooks, a giant bald eagle swooped right in front of me. (It was roughly the size of a small horse.) It glided over the cliff, heading across the river, and I am probably lucky it did not cause me to wreck. I watched it as far as I could, mostly to make sure I was not imagining it. But nope, definitely a genuine, in-the-feather version of our national bird.

I am pretty sure the only thing more American than a bald eagle fly across the Potomac (on a road named for George Washington, no less) would be eating a Big Mac and an apple pie while watching a reality TV show.

About a quarter mile down the road, I saw a second bird, from farther away, that I think may have been a juvenile bald eagle. The coloring was all wrong for any of the hawks in the area, and the shape did not look like a vulture, so who knows.

A quick Google search showed that there are actually quite a few bald eagles in the area — including 20 nesting pairs along the Potomac — and in 2009 a pair was even nesting in the median on the GW Parkway. There is even a photo gallery dedicated to George Washington Memorial Parkway Bald Eagles. So I guess I should have been less surprised to have seen one this morning and more surprised that I had not seen one before now.

Maybe the first eagle I saw was either Alex or Belle, a pair that seems to have nested in the area last year:

-Susan

[Edit: I am pretty sure I have located the eagles' nest. If you're heading southbound on the GW Parkway, just where the entrance ramp for Spout Run comes into the Parkway, their nest is on the left in the median, maybe ten feet down from the top of the trees. It's pretty hard to miss once you know where to look.]

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Can the Mere Recognition of a State Be a Violation of International Law?

February 23, 2010

In the past few days, Russia has purported to enter into several agreements with Abkhazia, an autonomous region in Georgia that had proclaimed its own sovereignty and is now attempting to achieve recognized statehood. These agreements include the establishment of direct air traffic between Russia and Abkhazia (including an obligation on Russia to help repair the airport there) and the formalization of Russian presence in Abkhazia with a 49-year lease on a Russian military base in the region.

Abkhazian leaders have also proposed a law allowing Russians to purchase houses in Abkhazia on the same terms as Abkhazian citizens.

According to Georgia, these agreements were “illegally signed by an occupying power and a puppet regime”. NATO has likewise denounced the pacts as illegal. Given that Abkhazia is merely a region of Georgia under international law, the pact with Abkhazia cannot change Russia’s status as an illegal occupier of Georgia – and a violation of Article 2:4 of the UN Charter. (For obvious reasons, this poses a large hurdle on Georgia’s accession to NATO. If Georgia did succeed, the U.S. and other NATO nations could potentially be obligated under international treaty law to go to war with Russia.)

A few days ago, the Georgian president, Mikheil Saakashvili, released a statement on Georgia’s relations with Russia:

Recognition of independence of regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia was illegal and their occupation was illegal as well, although they do not call it occupation any more, they take the territory legally, but say it’s not occupation. What do you call it then, is it a military tourism? What are these Russian troops doing then illegally in the other country’s territory? The way Russian propaganda works is very clear – you blame someone of what you are doing or going to do.

Although Russia’s occupation of Abkhazia is plainly illegal, the accusation that the mere recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia is a violation of international law is more intriguing claim. Can the recognition of a state be, in itself, an illegal act?

So far, only four states recognize Abkhazia: Russia, Nicaragua, Venezuela, and, as discussed previously on this blog, Nauru. For two of these states, recognition may have in fact been in violation of international law. Both Venezuela and Nicaragua are signatories to the Montevideo Convention, and under Article 11 of that treaty,

The contracting states definitely establish as the rule of their conduct the precise obligation not to recognize territorial acquisitions or special advantages which have been obtained by force whether this consists in the employment of arms, in threatening diplomatic representations, or in any other effective coercive measure. The territory of a state is inviolable and may not be the object of military occupation nor of other measures of force imposed by another state directly or indirectly or for any motive whatever even temporarily.

So at least in theory then, Venezuela and Nicaragua could be in breach of a treaty obligation, although not CIL. Russia, however, along with all other non-American states, is not party to the Montevideo Convention. How then could its recognition of Abkhazia violation international law? Even had Russia not formally recognized Abkhazia, it would be entitled under international law to treat Abkhazia has a pseudo-sovereign in certain respects. For instance, during the American Civil War, the United Kingdom did not recognize the Confederacy as a sovereign state, but did accord them a “belligerent” status that allowed for Confederate ships to enter into ports on the same terms as ships flagged by recognized states. Even today, many nations will recognize private contracts, such as marriage, that were entered into under the auspices of a non-state, even if for other purposes the non-state is denied to have any independent existence.

The power to recognize other states is a privilege of statehood — not a duty. Had the constitutive theory of statehood had become a controlling principle of international law, there would be a stronger foundation for President Saakashvili’s claims about Russia. Judge Lauterpacht, a proponent of the constitutive theory, even suggested that international law should impose a duty on states to recognize other states.

This idea never took hold, however, and instead, under the declarative theory, states can use whatever criteria they wish when deciding whether or not to extend recognition to a new state, even if it otherwise meets all objective qualifications for statehood. Customary international law is more or less settled today on a declarative approach to statehood that declares a state is a state when it satisfactorily meets certain indicia of sovereignty. A state, therefore, is any entity that possesses “a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and the capacity to enter into relations with other states.”

But this formulation is more of a definition of what a state should be than any sort of normative command constraining state behavior. Although an argument could be made that a state is in violation of international law when it purports to “recognize” an entity that does not possess these four criteria, I would expect many states to outright reject the validity of this norm — given how subjective evaluations of statehood often are, if 77 states recognize a state and 116 do not, would the 77 now be committing an illegal act? On the close cases, obviously not. But even defining what is and is not a “close case” is a tricky call.

What about a state’s recognition of the statehood of something unambiguously inapplicable? What would it mean for one state to recognize, say, a cruise ship as an independent state? Or how about something truly absurd – how about a toaster? Would this be an “illegal” act, or would it be more akin to a null command, something that is simply not cognizable under international law?

Obviously, there are a lot of actions a state could take as a result of its recognition of another state that would contravene international law. But the act of recognition or non-recognition in itself is harder to characterize as something that can be “illegal.”

Meanwhile, whether or not Russia’s recognition of it was justified, Abkhazia is attempting to obtain further international support for its claims to sovereignty, perhaps recognizing that having Russia as its patron is more likely to result in Abkhazia’s relegation to puppet state status than in true statehood. Currently, Abkhazian delegates are visiting foreign countries throughout South American, attempting to establish diplomatic ties with and, more importantly, receive recognition from nations there:

The agenda of the Abkhazian delegation’s working visit to the region includes the development of economic relations with Latin American countries, he said.
“We are looking for ways to fill our relations not only with political statements, but also with specific economic projects,” the acting foreign minister said.
During the tour of Latin America, the Abkhazian delegation will visit Venezuela, Argentina, Ecuador, and Bolivia.

Up until now, the recognition Abkhazia has received from other states has been either politically or monetarily motivated. By attempting to secure ties with other countries through “economic projects,” Abkhazia hopes to establish international recognition that is not merely nominal but also persuasive proof of its sovereignty. To this end, Abkhazia has made a point of emphasizing that it possesses both a moral right to its statehood as well as a positive claim to statehood under international law:

Abkhazia insists that the question of its recognition “be considered not only in terms of the right to self-determination, but primarily in terms of view of international law,” the acting foreign minister said.
“In both cases Abkhazia has indisputable arguments,” he added.

More and more, I am becoming convinced that Abkhazia and, to a somewhat lesser extent, South Ossetia, are positioning themselves in a manner that will eventually allow them to make legitimate claims to statehood. They are obviously a long ways off, I would not be surprised if, within the next decade, one or the both of them find seats in the General Assembly.

-Susan

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.xxx

February 21, 2010

The International Centre For Dispute Resolution released a non-binding report on Friday, finding that the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) should not have rejected [PDF] the ICM Registry’s request for registration of the .xxx domain.

Originally, after one initial rejection and following a re-filing some years later, ICANN had approved ICM’s request for the creation of the .xxx domain. The publicity generated by this decision resulted in a flood of submissions from governments world-wide protesting the decision, ICANN withdrew its previously issued approval. (Because, apparently, the web address of www.porn.xxx is less objectionable than www.porn.xxx? Go figure.) ICM then filed for review, resulting in the advisory decision that was just issued.

An informative summary of the events running up to the ICDR decision can be found here, but this section pretty much says it all:

Once ICANN voted on June 1, 2005 to approve the application ICANN, could not reverse itself.

All of the discussion, arguments of governments, including that of the US Department of Commerce needed to happen before the vote, not after.

Duh.

And because it’s a good example of the sort of objections states raised in response to the .xxx domain, here is the letter written by the U.S. Department of Commerce to ICANN back in 2005, two months after the initial, later revoked, approval:

I understand that the Board of Directors of (ICANN) is scheduled to consider approval of an agreement with the ICM Registry to operate the .xxx top level domain (TLD) on August 16, 2005. I am writing to urge the Board to ensure that the concerns of all members of the Internet community on this issue have been adequately heard and resolved before the Board takes action on this application.

Since the ICANN Board voted to negotiate a contract with ICM Registry for the .xxx TLD in June 2005, this issue has garnered widespread public attention and concern outside of the ICANN community. The Department of Commerce has received nearly 6000 letters and emails from individuals expressing concern about the impact of pornography on families and children and opposing the creation of a new top level domain devoted to adult content. We also understand that other countries have significant reservations regarding the creation of a .xxx TLD. I believe that ICANN has also received many of these concerned comments. The volume of correspondence opposed to the creation of a .xxx TLD is unprecedented. Given the extent of the negative reaction, I request that the Board will provide a proper process and adequate additional time for these concerns to be voiced and addressed before any additional action takes place on this issue.

-Susan

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Sex Reassignment Surgery and De Morgan’s Laws

February 21, 2010

Via Language Log, “Sex-change surgery and universal grammar”, a post on a decision of the Tax Court that was released earlier this month. The decision addressed the question of whether medical expenditures undertaken in the course of sex reassignment surgery are deductible under the U.S. Tax Code.

Although simmering beneath the surface of the opinion is a barely restrained argument on sexual morality and gender essentialism (although with plenty of snide jabs and confidential asides on the quality of other judge’s arguments tucked away in the footnotes), the concurrences and dissents treat the debate, at least on its face, as a matter of linguistics. The opinion is, overall, a pretty fascinating one, with many potential points of interest, but I liked the angle Language Log pointed out: the kerfuffle over using rules of grammar and logic in statutory construction, i.e., “the dispute about how to interpret disjunction under negation—i.e., how to interpret expressions such as I don’t know anything about linguistics or tax law (with don’t signaling negation and or signaling disjunction).”

Section 213(d)(1)(A) of the Tax Code “allows a deduction for expenses paid during the taxable year for medical care that are not compensated for by insurance or otherwise and to the extent that such expenses exceed 7.5 percent of adjusted gross income.”

In turn, ‘medical care’ is defined as the amount paid “for the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, or for the purpose of affecting any structure or function of the body .” However, medical care does not include cosmetic surgery (or any “similar procedure”), which the Code defines as “any procedure which is directed at improving the patient’s appearance and does not meaningfully promote the proper function of the body or prevent or treat illness or disease.”

In O’Donnabhain v. Commission, the IRS was presenting the losing argument that Gender Identity Disorder (GID) was not a ‘disease,’ as it lacks any known organic basis, was rejected, given that mental disorders without an unknown organic cause have been accepted as a disease for IRS purposes for half a century. The IRS also argued that GID was “social phenomenon” that had been “medicalized,” but this characterization was also rejected in light of the medical evidence presented.

The tax court found for the petitioner and that sex reassignment surgery is in fact a deductible expense under the Tax Code. The IRS had also wanted to deny any deduction for the petitioner’s hormone therapy, arguing that hormone therapy, when intended to alter someone’s appearance, is a “similar procedure” that falls under the cosmetic surgery exclusion. (The court did, however, deny the deductions for the petitioner’s breast augmentation surgery — because petitioner had achieved some breast tissue from the hormone therapy alone, the augmentation was in fact cosmetic.)

Language Log describes the linguistic disagreement present in the opinion:

On the majority’s interpretation, the boldfaced language above means that an appearance-improving procedure doesn’t count as cosmetic surgery if it either promotes proper bodily function or prevents or treats illness or disease. The dissenters, on the other hand, argued that for such a procedure to be excluded from the cosmetic-surgery category, it has to both promote proper bodily function and prevent or treat illness or disease.

Judge Halpern’s concurrence cites to De Morgan’s laws:

In formal logic, there is a set of rules, De Morgan’s laws, relating the logical operators “and” and “or” in terms of each other via negation. E.g., http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/De_Morgan’s_laws. The rules are:

not (p or q) = (not p) and (not q)
not (p and q) = (not p) or (not q)

According to Halpern, “I believe the better view is to presume that Congress is careful in its drafting and drafts in accordance, rather than in conflict, with the rules of grammar and logic,” and therefore, the statute should be interpreted in light of De Morgan’s laws.

In his dissent, Judge Foley responded that “Judge Halpern’s mechanical application of De Morgan’s laws is not prudent. Simply put, congressional intent is not subservient to De Morgan’s laws.” As much as I disagree with the rest of Foley’s opinion, he does have a point here. For more on the validity of Halpern’s reliance on rules of logic to interpret language, read the rest of the post over at Language Log.

There were two further points of minor interest from the O’Donnabhain decision that caught my eye. The first was a citation by the court to Judge Posner, from an opinion of his holding that psychotherapy alone was ineffective:

The cure for the male transsexual consists not of psychiatric treatment designed to make the patient content with his biological sexual identity–-that doesn’t work-–but of estrogen therapy designed to create the secondary sexual characteristics of a woman followed by the surgical removal of the genitals and the construction of a vagina-substitute out of penile tissue.

I was curious to see the use of the informal “doesn’t” in a judicial opinion — I don’t think I have seen Posner take that tone before, but maybe he uses it as he has here, when he wants to come across as frank and authoritative about a potentially sensitive subject. The second comment was in Judge Holmes’ concurrence, which Halpern referred to somewhat dismissively as a “Brandeis brief.” Homes critiqued the majority’s opinion for deciding more than may have been strictly necessary, stating that:

It is not essential to the holding and drafts our Court into culture wars in which tax lawyers have heretofore claimed noncombatant status.

This struck me as an odd statement to make. Given the structure of our tax code and kinds of deductions provided for, it is impossible to administer our tax system is a way that avoids entering the “culture wars.” Moreover, the medical expenses deduction has often been a lightning rod for controversy; this is hardly the first time there has been a dispute on sensitive social and cultural matters related to it. How could it be otherwise? ‘Medical care’ is not in itself inherently scientific, clinical, and objective, as Holmes seems to imagine. The phrase “promote the proper function of the body” cannot be defined in anything but a normative fashion — for instance, can birth control or abortion be said to be part of “the proper function of the body”? What about gastric bypass surgery?

-Susan