Magic Bomb Wands, Corporate Liability, and the Alien Tort Statute

Continuing with the discussion from a previous post, there are currently a number of companies, many of them based in the UK, selling fraudulent bomb and narcotic testing devices to nations such as Iraq, Mexico, and Thailand. These “bomb detectors” are worthless, although the governments who purchase them believe they can do all sorts of miraculous feats, based upon the manufacturers’ claims. As a result of the sniffer devices’ failure to detect the presence of bombs, and the subsequent failure of authorities to identify and prevent the detonation of car bombs and other explosive devices, documented human deaths have resulted.

Potentially, then, fraudulent sniffers such as the ADE651 and the GT200 provide the basis for a civil claim in U.S. courts against the devices’ manufacturers, based upon the Alien Tort Statute (ATS).

Under Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the ATS provides a jurisdictional basis for causes of action that are “specific, universal, and obligatory.” This means, roughly, violations of international law such as torture, genocide, slavery, crimes against humanity, and other acts of a similar level of “badness” can be targeted (“subject to vigilant gatekeeping,” etc.).

While fraud on its own, with only commercial damages, clearly won’t qualify as the sort of international norm violation that creates ATS jurisdiction, fraud on the scale of the GT200 or ADE651 that leads, directly or indirectly, to human deaths is more in line with previous international law violations that U.S. courts have recognized as valid ATS causes of action. But showing that the sale of fraudulent bomb detectors is a tort in violation of international law isn’t the only obstacle — any would-be ATS plaintiff would also have to contend with the fact that Global Technical and other producers of the dowsing rods are private corporations run by private individuals. Although corporate liability under the ATS been the subject of intense scrutiny over the past few years, and gallons of academic ink have been spilled in debating the validity of corporate responsibility for human rights violations, almost all previous ATS cases have been based upon some sort of joint venture theory, alleging that a corporation bears secondary liability as a result of the corporation’s joint action with or aiding and abetting of a state actor.

Although ATS jurisprudence is currently in the midst of Circuit disarray, if the Supreme Court accepts the cert petition pending before them for Pfizer v. Abdullahi, we should get a much better idea on how the issues in a hypothetical ADE651 case would play out.

The two major legal hurdles in Pfizer v. Abdullahi would be similar to the two predominant issues in an ADE651 case, although the facts between the two differ significantly. First, did the companies that produced the dowsing rods violate an international norm capable of violation by a private party, or, if not, did they act sufficiently in concert with foreign states so as to be considered a “state actor”? Second, is the selling of fraudulent and potentially deadly ‘bomb detectors’ a violation of international law which is actionable under the Alien Tort Statute?

Can selling fraudulent bomb detectors result in private actor liability?

Starting with Kadic, ATS suits against a private actor must show either (1) the tort does not require state action to be a violation of international law, or (2) if state action is required, whether the private actor can be hooked for joint action or aiding and abetting with a state actor. From Unocal, the best precedent we have to date, we have a rough guide that although most violations of international law can only be conducted by states and not individuals, certain “egregious” acts are a violation of CIL even if conducted by a private party. Such acts include slavery, genocide, and war crimes, or, to a limited extent, other bad acts (like rape) that are committed in furtherance of the primary egregious crimes, like genocide.

Whether or not international law violations by private actors will always be limited to that category is uncertain; at any rate, not-completely-ludicrous arguments could be made that the act of knowingly procuring dangerous military equipment for foreign states that results in needless civilian deaths is a violation of international law even absent state complicity.

Even if the above can’t be shown, a joint act or aiding and abetting theory of liability would still be a possible option. From the facts know, there does appear to be substantial evidence that state governments have been acting in concert with dowsing rod suppliers to carry out the scheme. From the original article,

Aqeel al-Turaihi, the inspector general for the Ministry of the Interior, reported that the ministry bought 800 of the devices from a company called ATSC (UK) Ltd. for $32 million in 2008, and an unspecified larger quantity for $53 million. Mr. Turaihi said Iraqi officials paid up to $60,000 apiece, when the wands could be purchased for as little as $18,500. He said he had begun an investigation into the no-bid contracts with ATSC.

Essentially, there is a conspiracy going on here between ATSC, Ltd. and the Iraqi government to sell useless plastic objects at a grossly inflated price. From here, it isn’t too far a leap to reach the conclusion that ATSC knowingly sold dangerously defunct equipment to corrupt government officials, therefore placing civilians in imminent danger due to their faulty belief that they will be able to know when explosives are present.

Recently in The Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., the Second Circuit announced that “the mens rea standard for aiding and abetting liability in Alien Tort Statute actions is purpose rather than knowledge alone.” In contrast to most other ATS cases, showing that an ADE651 defendant possessed the requisite mental state will not be a particularly tricky proposition. I think it’s a more than fair assumption that ATSC and Global Techniques’ owners know damned well that the products they are selling are worthless snake oil, and that it wouldn’t be all that difficult to convince a jury of that fact.

Granted, dowsing rod producers could argue that their “purpose” was simply to sell a product, not commit human rights violations. The Talisman case was dismissed “because plaintiffs presented no evidence that the company acted with the purpose of harming civilians.” However, this is not the case of a corporation engaging in a legitimate business in a region where its partners conduct human rights abuses as a means of carrying out that business enterprise. As with the Zyklon B Case , you can’t argue you aren’t guilty of genocide because you “only intended to sell lice-remover,” when you know damned well your customers ain’t concerned with delousing.

A bigger concern would be that it appears the governments that are buying ADE651 sensors genuinely believe the devices work as advertised. Therefore, the States do not have the necessary intent of purposefully or knowingly endangering their population. So in essence, ATSC is only assisting governments to engage in corrupt acts — they are not aiding and abetting a state’s intentional endangerment of its citizens. At the very least, that would rule out Conspiracy liability, which requires furtherance of a “joint purpose.” However, although it’d take a lot more space to discuss the issue than I have here, I’m going to assume for now that courts are not going to accept the “it’s not a violation of international law because we were tricking states into killing their own citizens” defense. (And anyway, if the Court takes cert on Pfizer, we’ll shortly have an authoritative answer on the question of whether there can be corporate liability when there’s only cursory state involvement.)

Was there a violation of a norm of international law with the requisite specific, universal and obligatory character?

I’ve been jumping the gun a bit by asking whether or not ATSC or Global Techniques can be held up on a theory of primary or secondary liability. That’s all meaningless until it’s also shown that the tort they are alleged to have committed is also a violation of a “norm of international character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to the features” of such founding-era international crimes of piracy and beating up diplomats for sport.

Courts have held that the specificity and ease of definition of the international norm alleged to be violated are the “meat and potatoes” of ATS claims. Courts don’t really like plaintiffs with harebrained theories alleging that a corporation’s random activities violated a nebulous “right to health” or “right to not have their environment destroyed,” or other similar claims.

In Pfizer, the tort that plaintiffs alleged was committed in violation of international law is “the norm against nonconsensual medical experimentation.” Thanks to Nuremberg and the general legacy of the Holocaust, for the Pfizer plaintiffs, it will be slightly easier to prove that international law prohibits experimenting upon humans without their consent, and possibly that this norm is so firmly entrenched as to be capable of violation by private actors alone. Throw around the word “Mengele” a few times, and heck, you might even cause Scalia to at least pause for a couple seconds before he goes ahead and rejects the claim.

In contrast, there is not really any similar international condemnation of “selling bomb detecting devices that don’t work.” So the norm used as the basis of the tort will necessarily be of a more generalized character, based either in humanitarian or human rights law. Although humanitarian law might offer some possibilities, at least in Iraq or for other cases where the dowsing rods are bought for use in quasi-combat zones, that would still be pretty tricky to pull off. Though not completely analogous, the problems of applying war crimes to private military contractors shows the sort of international legal morass that results in. Or, if you wanted to get even more creative, you might borrow provisions from the Rome Statute, such as Art. 8(2)(b)(xx), which prohibits “employing… materials and methods of warfare which are of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.” Selling and using phony bomb detectors is, if you squint at it funny, employing materials that cause unnecessary suffering to civilians who are killed or maimed in resulting bomb blasts.

As for human rights violations, they are probably just as unsatisfactory. Although a “right to security” appears in seven international and regional human rights treaties, such as Art. 9(1) of the ICCPR, these norms are “universal but not obligatory,” and thus do not provide a firm enough basis for ATS claims.

Still, many ATS claims have been brought alleging violations of international norms far stranger than the ADE651 hypo. Like the suit against UAE officials for abuses of underage camel jockeys, Mother Doe ex rel. R.M. v. Al Maktoum, (S.D. Fla., July 30, 2007)(and no, “underage camel jockeys” is NOT a euphemism), and claims against companies selling bulldozers that were used to mow down Palestinian buildings, Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., (9th Cir. 2007). So it wouldn’t be the most objectionable ATS claim ever brought, at least, and if Pfizer does go before the Supreme Court, and an expansive opinion is returned (highly unlikely), then there would be plenty of wiggle room available for an ADE651 case to be brought forward. However, as things currently stand, the odds of such an ATS suit succeeding are not particularly good.

-Susan

Interconnected World

I love this map. Via NewScientist, Where’s the Remotest Place on Earth?


[Larger version available here.]

roads_2The map shows the travel times from anywhere on earth to the nearest city with a population of 50,000+. Taking into account roads, navigable waterways, and shipping lanes, the map shows how less than 10% of the earth’s (non-Antarctica) surface area is more than two days travel time away from an urban area. Also cool is how they calculated the travel times, as shown by this chart.

The remotest place of all is located on the Tibetan Plateau (34.7°N, 85.7°E). From this location, “it is a three-week trip to the cities of Lhasa or Korla – one day by car and the remaining 20 on foot.”

-Susan

The Security Paradox: Visible Security Measures Decrease Social Cohesion

From the “unintended consequences” files, apparently the presence of surveillance cameras in urban environments does not reassure citizens, but rather increases people’s anxiety and apprehension of crime:

People are no more fearful of crossing a street with a young male skinhead in it than they are a street with a smartly dressed woman present, unless, that is, a CCTV camera is overhead. The new finding appears to undermine one of the key justifications for Britain’s network of 4.2 million surveillance cameras: that they provide reassurance to the public. It seems that the sight of a CCTV camera can have the opposite effect, cueing the perception of a threat.

The CCTV camera by itself did not cause apprehension, nor did a skinhead on his own. But shown images of both the skinhead and the CCTV, people’s stereotypes of skinheads became primed, and they displayed an increased fear of crime that does not occur when merely witnessing a skinhead without any other external cues to suggest a threat.

The CCTV/apprehension effect isn’t just limited to the UK. A similar phenomenon has been documented in the U.S.:

Where pre-existing anti-social stereotypes may be primed, or no pre-existing sense of threat and immediate need of security are evident, the presence of formal deterrence measures like CCTV, when noticed, may in fact come to represent a proxy symbol of the threat that others pose. Interestingly, Schweitzer et al. (1999) also found that the density of ‘neighbourhood watch’ [sic] signs increased FOC (fear of crime) within American urban locations, so this process may not be specific to CCTV, but part of a general response to environmental features that can indicate the ‘trustworthiness’ of others when making FOC-related appraisals.

I’d imagine a similar effect is caused by the presence of police officers. The idea of the “neighborhood cop,” a familiar police presence who has worked closely with a community, might provide reassurance to a small neighborhood area, but most cops on the streets are anonymous faces, serving more to remind people of the disembodied, lurking threats of urban life rather than inspiring confidence and feelings of safety.

There is no theoretical reason why such things as covers to protect other people seeing the entry of pin numbers for card payments, remote entry systems to flats, swipe card keys, barbed fencing, toughened barriers in shops, and even the armed officer within an airport, could not all play the same role. In essence, in respect of FOC for a given location and trust in the ‘other’, noticeable situational deterrence measures may be a double-edged sword.

The physical and practical measures used to increase a city’s security and its citizen’s welfare might also cause a corresponding decline in social cohesion and trust. That, in turn, could increase the need for security measures in the first place. Individual criminal acts do cause a net welfare loss to society, but an even bigger loss may be caused by the fear and apprehension crime engenders. If CCTV’s or Neighborhood Watch signs increase societal fear of crime beyond the “optimum level” — that is, cause a level of fear greater than what is needed to encourage people to take sensible precautions — then they should be replaced with less visible security measures.

-Susan

The ADE651 Bomb Detector Fraud and the Potential for an Alien Tort Statute Claim

This article in the New York Times,* on the worthless bomb-detective divining rods currently being used by Iraqi forces to deter terrorists, might provide the basis for an extremely interesting lawsuit under the alien tort statute. Assuming you could get personal jurisdiction, and ignoring the fact that practically speaking there are much better alternatives out there, could an alien suffering some kind of legal injury bring suit in the U.S. against the manufacturer of the device?

The bomb-sniffing rod at issue in the NYT article is the “ADE651® device,” produced by ATSC, Ltd., a UK company. The device is essentially a divining rod or ouija board; it has no external power source, no apparent means of explosives detection, and is only operable by those who have been “carefully trained” in its use. Oh, and Iraq has apparently spent $85 million on them.

The Lebanon distributor of the ADE651, Prosec, provides this handy picture of the device, along with the accompanying description:

“The range of detection is around 50 meters with obstacles and up to 600 meters in outdoor areas, the unit can also detect explosives submerged in water or buried underground. Detection from a hovering helicopter is also possible.”

The Prosec spokesperson then added, “It can also receive free cable, make perfectly popped popcorn every time, and roast a 9 lb. turkey in under an hour.”ade651 snakeoil

The principle behind ADE651′s ability to detect explosives has been variously described as “electrochemical (Thermo-Redox) detection,” “nuclear quadrupole resonance,” “electrostatic ion attraction,” or, as Jim McCormick, the owner of ATSC, explained it, “The principal is Electrostatics. It is more akin to Coulomb’s Law than Gauss’.”

Now, where would the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) claim lie in all of this? Clearly in a purely US-domestic matter this would be grounds for a pretty heavy fraud action, but the ATS is not an open ended jurisdictional grant. It provides only that “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”

So in the hypothetical of a case brought by an Iraqi against ATSC, Ltd., the “by an alien” requirement is clearly met, as is the “for a tort only” requirement, as fraud can be the basis of a tort claim. However, given current ATS jurisprudence, fraud is not the kind of tort that is “committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”

So rather than the ADE651, a better test case would be provided by the GT-200, which is by produced by Global Technical, a UK corporation. (Global Technical, by the way, alleges on its website to be a “United Nations Registered Supplier.” Anyone out there know what the hell this means? I’m assuming it’s fraudulently made up by Global Technical, in which case the UN needs to do something about it now.) The GT-200 is a dowsing rod device much like the ADE651. It needs no external power source and runs off of the “electro-static electricity” created by the human holding it.

The FAQ of the product contains the following gems:

Q: Can GT200 detect all types of narcotics and explosives?
A: Yes.

Q: Is there anything that can stop or block the GT200 from detecting substances?
A: To date, we have not found anything that will totally block or stop the substance signal being detected.

Q: What is the maximum distance that the GT200 can detect?
A: The detection distance for general search is up to 700 meters. It can detect substances in water (fresh or salt) up to a depth of 850 meter. In the case of buried substance it can detect up to 60 meter deep. For aerial reconnaissance, the distance extends to 4 kilometers.

While fraud is clearly at work with the GT-200, there’s something else important about it as well: the deaths of three policeman in Thailand have been attributed to the ‘malfunction’ of a GT-200:

As for an explosive-detection device, called the GT-200, that malfunctioned in detecting bombs and preventing an attack, the police chief said he would discuss with technicians, but needed more information before commenting.

A fourth death caused by the device occurred last month, also in Thailand:

Recently, the GT200 showed false negative results on 6 October 2009 at a bombing near Merlin Hotel, Sungai-Kolok district, Narathiwat province which caused one death and several injuries, as well as on 19 October 2009 during a bombing at the Pimonchai market, Muang district, Yala. During these two incidents, officials were called beforehand to check a car and motorcycle under suspicion. The device was not able to detect any dangerous substances. The bombs exploded a few minutes after the examinations.

Unlike the hypothetical case alleging mere commercial fraud, if the GT-200 can be attributed to human deaths, whether in the course of war or in police actions, the jurisdictional basis for a claim under the alien tort statute just got a whole lot stronger.

Next up: Magic Bomb Wands, Corporate Liability, and the Alien Tort Statute.

Update: Jim McCormick, chief director of the company that makes the ADE651, has finally been arrested.

-Susan

*This is completely unrelated to anything above, but while writing this post I was amused to find that the author of the NYT piece apparently did some of his own research on web message boards, as you can see from his post here, asking one of the forum contributors (“DubiousDick”) to contact him. Isn’t contacting random internet commenters for a story something blogs do, rather than major national newspapers?

And thus, through the Richmond Hellmouth, 1,000 new lawyers were unleashed upon the world.

Your esteemed bloggers here at LL2 took this morning off from their rigorous blogging schedule to drive to Richmond, so we could be admitted to the Virginia Bar. Today has now been the third time for someone to inform us that, “Today you are finally a lawyer!”, the previous two occasions being when we graduated from law school and when we passed the bar. At any rate, I am pretty sure that by whatever measure you’re going by, there is now no question that we are officially 100% actual real live little baby lawyers.*

-Michael & Susan

*Unless, of course, someone asks if we are lawyers in DC, in which case we are required by law to inform them that we are not in fact lawyers.

The Oxymoronic Concept of ‘NATO Intelligence’

In 2008, a FOIA request resulted in the release of a (redacted) version of a 1984 CIA article: NATO Intelligence: A Contradiction in Terms.

The report is pretty scathing:

“Since its inception, NATO has essentially opted out of the intelligence business. The command structure is almost totally innocent of any inherent capability for detecting or analyzing what is really going on. An almost pathetic aspect of the situation is the occasional effort by well meaning national officers to find ways to feed the very life blood of a viable defense system (intelligence) into a virtual corpse.”

The report places most the blame for the failure of NATO intelligence on the compartmentalization of national intelligence services — that is, an institutional structure that relies on each state serving its own intelligence needs rather than relying on coordinated intelligence gathering. “[W]hile it may have made sense in the late 1940s to designate intelligence as a national responsibility because of broad similarities in intelligence gathering capabilities among the nations, the matter is much less clear today. The United States, with its global systems, backed by an intelligence budget exceeding the total defense expenditures of most of the other members, has developed systems for supporting its tactical forces that the others can never hope to match. And still they must all be prepared to fight a common enemy on a common battlefield.”

The report describes the failure in NATO intelligence as a failure to apply the concept of relative advantage to the realm of multinational intelligence gathering. With the U.S. supplying 90% of all of NATO’s intelligence, with the rest of NATO combined making up the remaining 10%, “NATO’s practice of treating intelligence as a national responsibility—as though each of the members could serve the needs of its own forces in war as well as in peace” appears to be a gross misuse of resources. By operating under compartmentalized national intelligence services, the coalition forces are simply adding their individual efforts together, rather than allowing states to benefit from strengths of the others so as to improve the quality of each nation’s military capabilities. Such an approach to NATO lies upon “the very dubious proposition that the combat effectiveness of Dutch forces, for example, served by Dutch intelligence, is the best we can expect from the Netherlands.”

This failure to coordinate intelligence strategies is, of course, ultimately not just a problem for spooks, but a very real dilemma on the battlefield, when multinational forces are employed. By not sharing intelligence information with other national forces, we either maintain “rigid adherence to the integrity of national formations at the corps level, which could mean collapse of a front while units of a different nationality stand idly by,” or else put U.S. troops at unnecessary risk by depriving them of the of vital U.S. intelligence whenever a U.S. division serves subordinately to the command of another NATO nation’s military.

In the 25 years since the article was published, its primary arguments have not become outdated. Despite attempts to achieve greater cooperation between NATO members regarding intelligence resources, compartmentalization remains the default rule. NATO’s failure to coordinate intelligence services neutralizes what could be the alliance’s most significant contribution, particularly with today’s ‘war on terror.’ Asymmetrical warfare is also asymmetrical in the sense of the relative amounts of intelligence vs. brute force required. During the Cold War, large amounts of both multilateral intelligence and multilateral military force were necessary. Today, the amount of physical military force required to attack targets is, comparatively, exceedingly low — a single nation’s forces are more than capable of taking out a terrorist base. The capabilities of NATO’s combined military force are of less practical use, therefore, than NATO’s combined intelligence gathering capabilities could potentially be.

This asymmetry, however, is also why achieving an efficient division of labor in the intelligence field is close to impossible, even if in theory it would increase net military ability. It is because the power to shape world policy is not divided equally among the various roles to be carried out: “As the result of the ‘revolution in military affairs’, [PDF] the United States will find itself unable to interoperate with lesser forces, and NATO will find itself providing various forms of follow-on support, from medical services to military policing. In other words, the information and technology gap will relegate NATO to washing the dishes.” Because a single country has the ability to fulfill most or all of its force requirements (to the point where multilateral forces are carrying out a political strategy of avoiding unilateralism, rather than any military strategy), the gains to be had from sharing intelligence with other nations accrue overwhelmingly to the state that is using the intelligence to carry out military operations. The states specializing in “dish washing” will improve NATO’s ability to carry out its objectives, but forfeit much of their ability to decide what NATO’s objectives should be. This is not a trade-off most if any will agree to:

“Some might argue that in military terms such a transatlantic division of labour could make sense. European states have been proud of their specialist skill-sets right across the field of low-intensity conflict, counterterrorism, peacekeeping and humanitarian aid. All these activities are accompanied by specialist types of intelligence support and intelligence cooperation. Human intelligence, as much as technical systems, is at a premium in these situations. When the British troops arrived in Kosovo, Richard Holbrooke exhorted them to do what they had done successfully in Northern Ireland. More recently, in Afghanistan, the United States has done most of the invading while the Europeans have been bequeathed the task of nation-building. Yet while this arrangement may be pragmatic, such a stark separation of roles will quickly corrode transatlantic solidarity.

Specialization of services when it comes to joint military operations does not, unfortunately, promise the same benefits for national security as trade specialization does for the global economy. It is much easier (though not easy!) for states to agree to a common goal of ‘increasing net economic gain for everyone by specializing in particular goods’ than it is for states to agree to ‘increase net intelligence capabilities of NATO forces by letting the U.S. control the show and having everyone else provide background support.’ So although NATO intelligence is a contradiction in terms, greater integration of NATO members’ intelligence resources in unlikely to be achieved.

-Susan

House To Condemn Israeli War Crimes Report

Apparently, the House is about to consider a resolution harshly condemning the Goldstone Report, a U.N.-sponsored report on recent Israeli violations of international law.  Although the whole resolution is worth reading, I’m particularly stunned by a line suggesting that criticism of Israel might end democracy as we know it:

Efforts to delegitimize the democratic State of Israel and deny it the right to defend its citizens and its existence can be used to delegitimize other democracies and deny them the same right.

I’m not an expert in Israeli-Palestinian relations, and I certainly understand that the United States has always (and will always) fiercely defend Israel.  But do we really need to go out of our way to make excuses for their misbehavior?  Why do Senators who get so angry to condemn violations of international law in our military campaigns (see, e.g., Guantanamo) go out of their way to approve of such actions in another country’s? 

Susan probably has a better grasp of the issues on this one, but something here certainly smells fishy to me.

-Michael

Law Firm Sues To Dissolve Itself

In something that sounds like a line from a lawyer joke, South Florida firm Rothstein Rosenfeldt Adler filed suit in Broward County court today seeking to dissolve itself.  The Complaint [PDF] explains that the firm’s managing partner, Scott Rothstein, has allegedly engaged in a scheme to defraud investors in a structured settlement scheme associated with the firm.  When the firm learned that many of the structured settlement funds could not be accounted for this weekend, everybody wanted Rothstein gone.  Unfortunately, he claims to own a 50% stake and, unsurprisingly, is unwilling to vote himself out.

This story could turn out to be one of the most bizarre of the increasingly frequent law firm dissolution stories lately.

-Michael